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CRITICAL REVIEW
BETWEEN YOU AND ME:  
MAKING MESSES WITH CONSTRUCTIVISM AND CRITICAL THEORY
KELLEE CATON
Faculty of Adventure, Culinary Arts and Tourism, Thompson Rivers University, British Columbia, Canada
New social science researchers often grapple with questions of scholarly identity and paradigm 
belongingness in a postmodern world. On one hand, there are perhaps more options than ever, in 
terms of philosophical orientations to research that are taken seriously across the landscape of social 
scholarly disciplines. On the other hand, however, these philosophical orientations (typically pre-
sented as paradigms) have solidified to such a degree in writing and teaching on qualitative inquiry 
that they can feel confining, leading students to feel that more than one “paradigm” resonates with 
their personal sensibilities, and therefore to wonder where the points of tension actually lie between 
different orientations to research—for indeed, what is learned in the classroom about convergences 
and divergences between research perspectives is sometimes not borne out in our lived experiences in 
the field. In this critical review article, which is meant to be both a personal reflection and an analyti-
cal methodology exploration, the author engages in an exercise of “rethinking,” in which she ques-
tions earlier claims regarding the tension between two increasingly popular research approaches in 
her own field of tourism studies—namely, constructivism and critical theory—and attempts to inter-
rogate what is really at stake between these perspectives. Ultimately, the author concludes that the 
tension between these two traditions may lie in a surprising place: it may not be ontological, and not 
necessarily even political, but pedagogical and care oriented. She then ponders the inherent challenge 
that lies in the tension between these two perspectives, in terms of the quest to forge a social research 
approach that is reflexive, critically and politically oriented, and respectful of participants and their 
lived experiences. By situating her analysis within the context of her own doctoral research project, 
she hopes not only to capture the analytical dimension of working at a methodological crossroads, 
but also to offer a window into the ways that such issues are worked through in our own respective 
and embodied research journeys. (Abstract by A.-M.H.)
Key words: Paradigm debate; Qualitative research; Reflexivity; Research ethics;  
Researcher–participant relationship; Scholarly identity
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Introduction
When I was nearing the end of my own doctoral 
work in 2007, I embarked on what turned out to be 
a rather epic job search. I was “on the market” for 
years—that lovely expression that makes those of 
us described by it feel like ham hocks hanging in 
a street market booth, ready for consumer inspec-
tion—and in all that time, I got pretty good at articu-
lating a pithy “elevator description” of my research 
interests for anyone who would give me an ear for 
3 minutes. Each time I was asked, I would explain 
that my work follows two primary tracks: first, I 
investigate the role of tourism in ideological pro-
duction, and second, I explore the lived experience 
of tourism. I think this two-pronged description 
probably made search committees conclude that I 
was “unfocused,” a charge all too readily leveled at 
qualitative scholars, who tend to like to go where 
the data lead us, in an occupational climate that 
prizes the Dumbo’s feather of constructed trans-
parency, in which we assure others of our value by 
laying out a tidy plan of what our research line will 
contribute—or at least by having the courtesy to 
bluff about it.
The truth, however, is that the relationship 
between my two research tracks is far from ran-
dom. It arises from a basic feature of life, which 
I will call the paradox of self. What I mean by 
this is that, as humans, we exist in some sense as 
discrete entities, each with our own body, biogra-
phy, and perspective. At the same time, however, 
we are not discrete: our very DNA connects us to 
each other across time, our ideas are the product of 
intersections with that which lies outside ourselves, 
and our behaviors create consequences that ripple 
well beyond our individual lives. Our thoughts and 
actions intrude upon each others’ biographies such 
that we are simultaneously both many and one. 
Thus, whenever I approach tourism phenomena, I 
find that there are always stories unfolding on two 
different levels at the same time. The first is that of 
individuals, each on their own life trajectories, who 
share with me their experiences of being tourists or 
tourism service providers, or the physical manifes-
tations of their creative energies, such as a personal 
scrapbook or an advertising campaign. The sec-
ond is that of society—of the social consequences 
that arise when people from different backgrounds 
encounter, represent, perform for, and make sense 
of one another through tourism, for pleasure, for 
education, or for survival. My respect for these 
two stories—for the magic of individual human 
beings (human becomings?) unspiraling on their 
own unique paths and for the awesome responsibil-
ity that derives from the fact that we humans have 
the power to affect one another’s lives—has been 
a fundamental force in shaping my identity as a 
tourism scholar.
Like many young scholars today, I came of age 
in a rather odd philosophical milieu. On one hand, 
I took the standard methods classes and read the 
standard texts, where I encountered descriptions of 
various social research traditions. Positivism, post-
positivism, critical theory, and constructivism were 
laid out before us, juxtaposed in neat matrices pre-
pared by towering intellectual figures like Guba and 
Lincoln (1998, 2003), with tidy descriptions of the 
places where their core ideas were seen to converge 
and diverge. It is probably not an exaggeration to say 
that most social researchers of my generation will 
feel eternally indebted for these efforts. Such handy 
tools were great facilitators as we attempted to wrap 
our heads around the sea of new concepts we were 
encountering, and they were also convenient and 
reassuring aids for scholarly identity building: we 
could scroll through the matrix until we found the 
research tradition that matched our particular sen-
sibilities, almost as though we were shopping for a 
breakfast cereal that met all the right criteria: high 
fiber, no raisins, chocolate coating—Bingo! The 
right selection and our dissertation methodology 
could be complete. More importantly, we would be 
able to articulate to our rapidly growing selves who 
we were, what we were doing, and what we believed 
in. On the other hand, this ease was disrupted by 
another prevailing intellectual force: a destabilizing 
postmodern sensibility that made the whole smor-
gasbord of research philosophy seem ripe for the 
taking, a set of ingredients that could be mixed and 
matched to customize an individual approach. Tak-
ing this latter path is not easy, though, and it inevi-
tably forces us to rethink the ideas that have been 
handed to us about various research approaches and 
what is really at stake between them.
This critical review article—one part analyti-
cal methodology exploration, one part personal 
reflection—is meant to be just such an exercise in 
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rethinking, in this case, about the tensions between 
two increasingly popular philosophical approaches 
in tourism studies, which served, in an uneasy part-
nership, to anchor my own dissertation research a 
half decade ago: constructivism and critical theory. 
In this analysis, I question earlier claims regarding 
the places where these two traditions tend to butt 
heads and then attempt to interrogate what is really 
at stake between them. Ultimately, I conclude that 
the tensions between constructivism and critical 
theory may lie in a surprising place: they may not 
be ontological, and not necessarily even political, 
but pedagogical and care oriented, having more to 
do with the existence of different moral imaginar-
ies about how people (in this case, researchers and 
study participants) can best do right by each other 
than with researchers’ basic beliefs about the nature 
of reality or the point of the research endeavor.
There are many ways of approaching the rela-
tionship between the researcher and the study par-
ticipants in social inquiry. A traditional, positivistic 
view would hold that research participants are there 
to provide data and that the researcher’s goal is to 
extract that data; it would essentially remain silent 
on the issue of morality in the context of that rela-
tionship, aside from its concern that the research be 
conducted in line with ethical standards governing 
the profession, as laid down by formal bodies like 
research ethics boards. Many interpretivist schools 
of thought, however, have evinced a greater aware-
ness of the complexities that arise in what are inevi-
tably human relationships embedded in the context 
of the social research encounter. Feminist research-
ers, in particular, have been at the forefront of argu-
ments about obligations on the part of the researcher 
toward his or her participants that go beyond the 
call of the typical research ethics approval form.
Such discussions have opened the possibility 
of imagining research encounters in more diverse 
ways than as simply forums for data transmission. 
Like any substantive communicative exchange, 
they are also potentially spaces for reflection, per-
spective enlargement, and personal growth, on the 
part of both the researcher and the participant (see 
Caton, 2013, for a philosophical account, and Bott, 
2010, for an excellent empirical example, in the 
context of her work with British lap dancers in Ten-
erife). Thus, research encounters potentially have 
a pedagogical capacity. And, like all substantive 
human interactions, they are spaces in which we 
must navigate questions of how to do right by one 
another—spaces in which we have a duty of care to 
one another.
Although the issue of the relationship between 
the researcher and study participants is beginning to 
receive more attention, as evidenced by the creation 
of new categories in Guba and Lincoln’s (2003) 
updated matrix like “inquirer posture” and “ethics,” 
it nevertheless continues to lack the level of consid-
eration it deserves in qualitative inquiry discussions 
on paradigmatic conflicts and confluences—and 
methodological issues, in general, lack sufficient 
attention in tourism forums (Duval, 2006). The 
goal of this critical review article is thus to explore 
the issue of the tension between constructivism 
and critical theory in more depth, abstractly and 
 analytically—debunking old myths and opening new 
questions about what is really at stake between these 
two perspectives—while also offering a window 
into the concrete reality of what it felt like, for one 
lone doctoral student, to navigate the messy space 
between these philosophical traditions in the prac-
tice of trying to create tourism understandings. In so 
doing, I seek to engage with the invocation of schol-
ars like Gabb (2010), working in the intimate and 
ethically loaded area of family studies, and Brogden 
and  Patterson (2007), working in education studies, 
who argue for the need to offer sustained attention 
to the unique kinds of ethical dilemmas that qualita-
tive researchers face as they go about making their 
impacts on the social world. These scholars offer 
profound, empirically situated discussions of the 
complexity of the care ethic in qualitative research 
practice, and in the case of Gabb (2010), highlight 
the way that “commitment to participants can come 
into conflict with the academic need for a critical 
analytical mind” (p. 461)—a concern central in my 
exploration here of the tensions between construc-
tivism and critical theory. Like these scholars and 
many others, I agree that one of the most impor-
tant ways we can attend to such matters is to give 
deep reflexive consideration to our interactions and 
relationships with our research participants.
A Tale of Two Traditions
Both constructivism and critical theory are 
 complex intellectual movements that can better be 
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imagined as skeins of ideas (to borrow a metaphor 
from Peters & Burbules, 2004) than as unified the-
ories: they are each like balls of yarn, made up of 
strands that are individual and separate, yet twisted 
together and generally moving in the same direc-
tion. Thus, to characterize these two movements 
fully here would be impossible. Instead, I shall 
simply aim for the standard garden variety descrip-
tion of these perspectives—the type that is typically 
served up for doctoral students—and then, to stick 
with the knitting analogy, hope that (as my friend 
who likes to make scarves is fond of saying) my 
characterization “passes the galloping horse test,” 
meaning that it looks good enough, from the per-
spective of someone at a distance moving quickly, 
to get the job done.
Thus, in short, we can say that constructivism is 
the term for a broad movement in social research 
philosophy and practice, which contends that knowl-
edge and truth about the social world are created 
rather than discovered, and that what we take to be 
social facts are actually the product of discursive 
practices that have favored some perspectives over 
others, making them appear natural and inevitable 
(Schwandt, 1998). Constructivists are typically 
viewed as rejecting the realist ontology and objec-
tivist notion of truth favored by postpositivists, 
instead subscribing to a relativist ontology, or the 
belief that reality is plural and exists as a set of “intan-
gible mental constructions, socially and experien-
tially based, local and specific in nature . . . and 
dependent for their form and content on the indi-
vidual persons or groups holding [them]” (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1998, p. 206). Epistemologically speak-
ing, constructivism operates under the belief that 
the “findings” of research are not actually found, 
but created through the investigator’s interaction 
with the studied phenomenon. The researcher’s 
identity and values cannot be excluded from the 
research process, and even if this were possible, it 
would not be desirable, as a researcher’s humanity 
is precisely what endows her with the capacity for 
empathy, a prerequisite for understanding others’ 
worlds (Baronov, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1998). 
Furthermore, constructivists (especially feminist 
theorists) tend to be highly concerned with rapport 
in the research process. Although rapport certainly 
aids in a researcher’s quest to understand how par-
ticipants make meaning of events in their lives, 
notions of respect, reciprocity, and compassion are 
more likely to be viewed not as simply a tool for 
data collection but as a moral imperative ( Watson, 
2009). Constructivists often view themselves as 
facilitators of “multivoiced reconstructions” of 
phe nomena (Guba & Lincoln, 2003, p. 260) and 
consciously attempt to avoid hegemonizing the 
perspectives of the individuals they study.
Taking a similar flyby of critical theory, we 
can say that this term is the signifier for a loose 
coalition of ideas whose origin can be traced back 
through the original Frankfurt School boys, to the 
earlier work of luminaries like Gramsci and Marx. 
In its most basic sense, critical theory foregrounds 
the existence of conflicts between social groups 
and attempts to work in the service of the margin-
alized (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003). It is overtly 
political, arguing that all intellectual labor should 
proceed with the goal of trying to right some par-
ticular wrong. Early critical theory, taking its cue 
from Marx, considered much extant social theory 
to be too esoteric and lacking in power to effect 
material improvements in individuals’ lives and 
instead emphasized scholarly work that produced 
obvious social action, and the movement still 
retains an activist flavor. However, critical theory 
has also been influenced by the work of postmod-
ern thinkers (Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003). Thus, 
an emphasis on discourse and its power in main-
taining systems of dominance has emerged (Parker, 
1998), and contemporary critical theorists are often 
engaged in projects that seek to deconstruct various 
cultural discourses to reveal the ways that symbolic 
practices operate to produce hegemony. While 
some would argue that the discursive turn has taken 
critical theory away from its activist roots, others 
would counter argue that deconstructing taken-
for-granted notions is a necessary step in effecting 
social change, because altering discourse means 
altering the very way that people understand the 
world around them, which renders actions different 
from those taken in the status quo sensible.
Ontologically, critical theorists are generally 
argued to subscribe to a position of “historical real-
ism” (Guba & Lincoln, 1998, p. 205), meaning a 
belief that individuals’ understandings of reality 
are distorted because they have been shaped by 
ideological factors; thus, social structures that are 
taken as “real” are actually historically evolved 
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and are neither natural nor inevitable, but they are 
nevertheless real in their consequences. Epistemo-
logically, Guba and Lincoln (1998) argue critical 
theorists to be in consort with constructivists in the 
belief that researchers and their values are inevi-
tably intertwined with studied phenomena. Critical 
theorists engage their values both in their decisions 
about what questions to problematize and in their 
interactions with participants, whom they often 
wish to enlighten. They have been traditionally 
argued to subscribe to a foundationalist perspective, 
in the sense that they locate truth in social struc-
tures of oppression, which conceal this truth from 
the hapless actors who are caught in them, unable 
to see their oppression or perceive the misalign-
ment between their own best interests and those 
of the system they have been socialized to uphold 
( Kincheloe & McLaren, 2003).
Upon considering these descriptions, what has 
traditionally popped out as constituting the con-
flict between constructivism and critical theory (at 
least as I was taught in grad school) appears to be 
twofold and centers around the notions of ontology 
and research purpose. This simple characterization, 
however, raises some important questions.
First, does it really make sense to say that con-
structivism and critical theory have different “basic 
beliefs” with regard to ontology? Ontology refers 
to one’s views about the nature of reality, and hold-
ing a realist ontology, in theory, simply means 
assuming that there is a reality out there, existing 
independently of any human who might wish to 
know about it. Despite descriptions of some new 
inquiry paradigms that would appear to argue to 
the contrary, it seems unlikely that many scholars 
of any stripe would oppose the basic notion that 
phenomena (broadly conceived) exist, regardless 
of whether we, as individual researchers, have any 
interaction with them or not. For example, it would 
seem foolish (not to mention highly egocentric) to 
assume that because I, as a social researcher, have 
never personally encountered any individuals living 
in Bangladesh and have no idea what they are up to 
in their corner of the world, that such individuals in 
fact do not exist and are not up to anything. Thus, 
most researchers would seem to be able to agree 
on the basic premise that there are objects, events, 
behaviors, and so forth going on in the world that 
exist external of any individual potential knower of 
them. To argue that most practicing constructivists 
would not abide this position (whether one wants to 
call it an “ontologically realist” viewpoint or some-
thing else) would seem to indicate a misreading of 
what these scholars actually believe (Gergen, 2009). 
Indeed, many qualitative inquiry writers have sug-
gested, explicitly or implicitly, that a realist ontol-
ogy is not incompatible with constructivist views 
at all (e.g., Barkin, 2010; Burr, 1998, 2003; Crotty, 
2003; Patomaki & Wright, 2000; Pernecky, 2012; 
Slife & Williams, 1995; Weinberg, 2008), and some 
have argued that adherence to a genuinely relativist 
ontology is not even really a marker of constructiv-
ism, but rather of solipsism (Pernecky, 2012).
Instead, what most qualitative scholars would 
emphasize is that what complicates social phenom-
ena, as opposed to physical phenomena, is that the 
former have meaning (Loseke, 1999; Schwandt, 
2003). If we accept symbolic interactionism’s 
general, and not very controversial, premise that 
people act toward objects and situations in their 
world on the basis of the meanings those objects 
and situations hold for them, then we can easily 
see why both constructivists and critical theorists 
are interested in meaning. Constructivists are 
interested in understanding the way individuals 
and groups make sense of their world in localized, 
historicized moments, as they believe that conse-
quences flow from these constructions. It is often 
their aim, through the research process, to help 
participants coconstruct new and more sophisti-
cated understandings that will lead to courses of 
action that enhance their quality of life (Guba & 
Lincoln, 1998). One key aim of critical theorists, 
in turn, is to understand how social structures (e.g., 
class, race, gender) influence the way people make 
sense of their lives and choices (as, again, these 
constructions have consequences), and to help 
people to recognize the ways they unknowingly 
participate in systems of dominance and oppres-
sion. Thus, if we can agree that understanding 
meaning is central to the work of constructivists 
(by definition), as well as to that of many critical 
theorists, then what is called into question philo-
sophically is not the nature of reality but the nature 
and consequences of meaning. The question of 
whether or not real things exist is different from the 
question of whether or not they have meaning and 
whether or not that meaning can be linked, through 
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compelling evidence and argumentation, to identi-
fiable tangible or ideological outcomes, which may 
then be deemed positive or negative (although cer-
tainly, all people involved may not agree on what 
a particular situation means, what outcomes appear 
to be flowing from it, or whether a given outcome 
is good or bad).
So is there a substantive difference with regard 
to ontology? It would seem that each perspective 
clearly 1) acknowledges the real existence of mul-
tiple meanings and 2) views real consequences as 
flowing from those meanings.
1
 Perhaps it is merely 
the language each perspective favors that causes 
the confusion. Constructivists tend to refer to 
“multiple realities,” but the idea that human real-
ity is characterized by “multiple meanings,” which 
are all equally “real” in the sense that they are all 
actually held by individuals, probably better cap-
tures the essence of their perspective. Similarly, 
the concept of “false consciousness,” sometimes 
used by critical theorists, illustrates an awareness 
of the existence of at least two ways of looking at 
a given situation: an unenlightened view, in which 
people accept their circumstances as natural and 
inevitable, and an enlightened view in which peo-
ple recognize the socially constructed nature of the 
system that constrains their life chances and make 
choices to oppose injustice. Both of these perspec-
tives are clearly viewed as “real,” in the sense that 
people actually subscribe to them, and they are also 
viewed as resulting in actual consequences, or there 
would be no purpose in attempting to rid people 
of “false consciousness.” Again, it seems to be the 
expression that is problematic, as the term “false” 
is not being used to express the idea of “not real,” 
but rather of “misinformed” or “failing to recognize 
one’s own best interests.” And constructivists must 
believe that there is some way to logically link indi-
viduals’ meaning-making activities with personal 
and social consequences. Otherwise, there would 
be no purpose in encouraging people to develop 
more informed and sophisticated constructions, 
as no positive consequences (not even internal 
ones in the minds of research participants) would 
ensue. Thus, both perspectives recognize the exis-
tence of multiple constructions, and neither tends 
to be concerned with judging these constructions 
as “true or false,” but rather as “better or worse,” 
depending on the nature of the outcomes produced. 
Both perspectives are less invested in truth than in 
consequences.
2
The view that critical theory and constructivism 
differ radically with regard to research aims seems 
to be similarly overstated. As noted, critical theory 
focuses overtly on the critique and transformation 
of exploitative social structures whereas construc-
tivism has traditionally claimed the more modest 
ground of seeking to understand people’s inter-
pretations of given phenomena and life situations 
(Guba & Lincoln, 1998), a position that has led it 
to garner criticism for “lacking a critical purchase” 
(Chambers, 2007, see also Schwandt, 1998). But 
such a cursory summation of this difference fails 
to capture the complexity of these two research 
approaches in practice. Although space does not 
permit an empirical analysis of recent acts of 
“doing” constructivism or critical theory, research 
philosophers have argued convincingly that current 
reasoning has brought the two perspectives closer 
together on this front. As Schwandt (2003) argues, 
today’s practicing constructivists are far from apo-
litical. Even prominent scholars hailing from the 
most extreme corners of the modern constructivist 
movement (say, Gergen or Denzin), who speak most 
vociferously about the lack of any foundations on 
which humans can securely base knowledge claims, 
often link their work to agendas of democracy or 
moral empowerment (Schwandt, 2003). Similarly, 
Kincheloe and McLaren (2003) argue that the influ-
ence of the “postdiscourses” (i.e., postmodernism, 
poststructuralism, and other perspectives that have 
encouraged scholars to radically question and move 
beyond received views of knowledge production) 
has brought critical theory closer to constructivism 
because researchers have come to recognize even 
the act of research as being power driven and to be 
more reflexive about their role in the social web as 
constructers and evaluators of knowledge and as 
voices of authority. In most cases, this has not led 
them to slide down the slippery slope into moral 
abandon, as awakening to antifoundationalist rec-
ognitions could theoretically lead some humans to 
do (McGettigan, 2000). Instead, most critical theo-
rists have gracefully picked themselves up from the 
dust that fell when antifoundationalism brought the 
walls down, and have come to the conclusion that 
they need not embrace foundationalist thinking in 
order to pursue a liberatory agenda. This position 
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is given perhaps its most powerful philosophical 
explication in the work of Rorty (1989, 1999), who 
concluded, at the end of his life and after decades 
of deep thought about the matter, that social hope 
can be located not in God nor in science nor an any 
other foundational doctrine, but only in the prag-
matic human urge to reach out to each other and 
to aid and comfort each other, in the best—if still 
bumbling—way we currently know how. Indeed, 
the new generation of antifoundationalist critical 
theorists has been active in creating a burgeoning 
literature on the need to relink knowledge pro-
duction and moral reasoning (Belhassen, 2007; 
Caton, 2012; House & Howe, 1999; Kincheloe 
& McLaren, 2003; Schwandt, 1996) because the 
absence of secure foundations for truth renders the 
human moral compass more important than ever.
For many of us working within the current “new 
paradigm” milieu, then, regardless of which par-
ticular badge of scholarly identity we may choose 
to bear, there is both a craving for justice, to bring 
about positive social change through our research 
activities, and also a recognition of our own limits 
and a drive for connection—the desire to reach out 
to others in our world, to respect their views and 
ways of making sense of the world, and to refuse 
the arrogant position of attempting to perform abso-
lute adjudication between conflicting constructions 
of reality. These impulses exist in tension with one 
another, and therein, in my view, lies the rub.
But before I go any further, let me tell you the 
story of Jim.
Encountering Jim
In the spring of 2007, I set out to collect the final 
pieces of data for my doctoral project. As noted, 
my work focuses on the role of tourism in ideologi-
cal production, and for my dissertation research, I 
was studying Semester at Sea (SAS, an American 
university study abroad program) in an attempt to 
understand how educational tourism might serve 
as a site of perpetuation or resistance to the hege-
monic Western discourses identified by so many 
tourism media scholars that continue to position the 
non-Western world in colonialist terms, as exotic, 
sensual, servile, backward, dependent, and mor-
ally inferior. I considered several sources of data 
for my project, and my final task was to gather the 
perspectives of SAS alumni through personal inter-
views. I wanted to understand how these individu-
als were making sense of the people, spaces, and 
cultures they had encountered while traveling.
Jim (a pseudonym) was one of several SAS 
alumni who was kind enough to share his story 
with me. I had scheduled to meet him on a sunny 
Saturday morning at a corner coffee shop near 
DePaul University. When I showed up there, I was 
greeted by a lanky, t-shirted guy in his mid-twenties 
who met me with a huge grin. Jim was immedi-
ately endearing. He told me about how Semester at 
Sea had completely changed his life: how meeting 
people all over the world had shaken up his white, 
middle class existence and made him realize racist 
assumptions he never knew he had harbored. He 
spoke of the kindness he encountered, as complete 
strangers offered to show him around their home-
towns and share their cultures, inviting his group 
of friends home for dinner and sometimes even 
for overnight stays. Especially, he discussed how 
the trip had made him change directions in life and 
realize what, for him, would make for a meaningful 
existence. As he explained,
Before the trip, I didn’t really know what I wanted 
to do with my life. I guess I thought I’d travel, 
maybe get a job in Vail [the Colorado Rockies 
resort] and be a ski bum and then eventually buy 
a big house in the suburbs. But seeing families all 
over the world . . . really made me gain focus. . . . 
Looking back on my first stop, which was Cuba, 
[I got] invited into these people’s home, and it was 
a one room place with a sink, and a toilet, with no 
shower, and I sat down in a room that just had these 
blankets piled up in the corner, and there were 20 
people who lived there, in one room, and you have 
never seen such happy people. Their smiles were 
from ear to ear, and these kids—you could tell 
they were just thrilled, happy kids, and I wanted 
that. There’s something about having that feeling 
in that room, and I thought, if I could somehow get 
to that point, then that’s all I would really want.
Jim told me that now that he was finished with 
college he could not wait to meet the love of his 
life and start a family. I immediately begin mentally 
scrolling through the list of nice single girls I knew, 
wishing I could think of someone to set him up 
with. He was just that great: open, sincere—quite 
simply, the kind of guy anyone would want her best 
friend to end up with.
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The problem, however, was that in some ways, 
Jim’s reasoning patterns fell in line with just the sort 
of discourses I was hoping programs like Semester at 
Sea would upend. Although his opinions could never 
be characterized as obnoxious, he did tend to engage 
in certain problematic reasoning patterns, like roman-
ticizing poverty. Although it was great that he recog-
nized that poverty and misery are not the same thing, 
he seemed not to grasp the distinction between poverty 
and voluntary simplicity, the salient point being that the 
latter is a choice. Also, because of his strong views that 
traveling with organized programs while the ship was 
in port was “not what Semester at Sea is about” and 
that such workshops merely served as a crutch for the 
“less adventurous who can’t open up,” mediating what 
would otherwise be a direct cross-cultural experience, 
he seemed to miss out on a lot of the intellectual con-
tent of the trip, which would have served to frame the 
experience and help him to make sense of some of what 
he was witnessing. For example, Jim commented that 
it was hard to see the challenges that many residents of 
poorer nations face, but when I asked him how he made 
sense of such vast inequality, he answered that he sup-
posed it was due to a lack of natural resources in these 
countries, combined with mismanagement and corrup-
tion on the part of their governments. Past colonial proj-
ects and current hegemonies were lost on him, despite 
the foregrounding of such issues in SAS’s curriculum.
The critical theorist in me wanted to speak up 
when Jim offered his analysis of the state of the 
world—to fill in some of the gaps in his Swiss-
cheesed shipboard education. I wanted to argue 
with him about the value of educator narratives in 
helping to frame international travel. I wanted to 
offer him a different view that might broaden his 
perspective. But I was loathe to scare him away. 
The constructivist in me feared he would think I did 
not find his perspective valid or valuable. I didn’t 
want him to think I thought he was a bad person—
which I didn’t.
3
 I sat there frozen. I took in all he 
had to say and told him how much I had enjoyed 
talking with him and how much I appreciated his 
participation in my study. And that was that.
Rethinking the Tension Between 
Constructivism and Critical Theory
My encounters with Jim and with the other par-
ticipants in my study, as well as my engagement 
with the research philosophy literature regarding 
the evolving trajectories of constructivism and 
critical theory, have led me to an interesting real-
ization about what is at stake between these two 
perspectives. Clearly, practitioners coming from 
both angles typically want to extend themselves in 
the service of others. The difference seems to lie in 
each’s orientation regarding how to help.
Constructivism seems to approach caring as a 
matter of respecting autonomy. Emphasis is placed 
on respecting the conclusions that individuals’ own 
experiences have led them to reach. There is also 
an emphasis on showing respect for the diverse 
processes through which people come to know the 
world. Constructivism’s orientation toward care 
as respect for individuality and autonomy makes 
sense, given its close relationship with standpoint 
theories like feminism and critical race theory, 
which struggle against patriarchy, racism, and other 
forms of oppression. It is easy to imagine why, upon 
entrance to the academy, members of marginalized 
groups, whose ways of knowing had not previously 
been valued, would consider listening, exercising 
tolerance, and acknowledging the validity of oth-
ers’ perspectives to be key components of respect 
and caring.
Alternatively, critical theory seems to approach 
caring more as a matter of nurturing growth through 
information sharing. Communication on the part of 
the researcher is emphasized to enable individuals 
to begin to see their lives from perspectives they 
may not previously have been able to access. While 
critical theorists have historically had the troubling 
reputation of viewing social structures somewhat 
deterministically and believing themselves to hold 
the true knowledge of the inner workings of the 
world, which they must use to enlighten others, 
contemporary critical theory has, as noted, been 
very much influenced by the currents of postmod-
ernism, which emphasize the endless interpretive 
possibilities that exist in the space where indi-
vidual agents and structures collide. Thus, post-
modern critical theorists are logically more likely 
to view working for social change as a dialogue, 
in which researchers, participants, and even read-
ers of the written research report bring their own 
understandings to the encounter and deliberate with 
one another to encourage the development of per-
spectives that produce better (typically more just, 
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democratic, and compassionate) outcomes. This 
tendency toward viewing the research encounter as 
a dialogue between evolving perspectives is nicely 
encapsulated by a recently emergent series of 
approaches to social research, known variously as 
the participatory, participatory action, or delibera-
tive democratic paradigms (see Heron & Reason, 
1997; House & Howe, 1999; Howe, 2005), which 
represent a wedding of the constructivist commit-
ment to noncoercive research practice to a growth- 
and action-oriented framework derived, in large 
measure, from the legacy of critical theory. Thus, 
the goal from both sides seems increasingly to be the 
forging of a social research approach that is reflex-
ive, critically and politically oriented, and respect-
ful of participants and their lived experiences.
Of course this is sticky in practice. I am reminded 
of a story from my childhood, from a book that I 
loved to read when I was around 11 or 12 by Barthe 
DeClements (1984), called Seventeen and In 
Between. In the book, one of the characters, Jack, 
who has dropped out of high school to work in the 
logging industry, relates a story to his best friend 
Elsie about a profound exchange he has had with 
a local shaman. The exchange occurred when Jack 
and the shaman went walking in the woods, and 
upon approaching a tree, the shaman asked Jack 
which way he planned to go around it. Jack, con-
fused, replied that he supposed he would go to the 
right. The shaman suggested he go to the left and 
then asked Jack if Jack thought the shaman had any 
right to be telling him which way to go around the 
tree. Jack concluded that he did not, an answer that 
pleased the shaman, although the two pondered the 
idea that perhaps the shaman had special knowl-
edge and was trying to prevent Jack from harming 
himself by going the wrong way. Elsie recalls the 
story later when she catches herself about to pass 
judgment on one of her classmate’s behaviors, 
and as such, the story provides a nice message for 
young readers about tolerance and the importance 
of allowing others to live their lives as they see fit. It 
still resonates with me so many years later, though, 
because in truth, I can see both sides of the story. I 
prize my autonomy, but I am not sure I would like 
to break my ankle tripping over a tree root if some-
one could have foreseen my fall and suggested I 
take a different route around the tree. One person’s 
savior is another’s imperialist.
So where does this leave Jim and me? Was I 
showing good, constructivist respect for his per-
spective by keeping quiet when I found his reason-
ing problematic? Was I merely weaseling out of 
creating conflict with someone I could tell was a 
kind human being? Was the weaseling worth it to 
maintain rapport? I am reminded here of Shuman’s 
(2006) warning (cited in Watson, 2009) that an 
empathetic approach can end up “serving the inter-
ests of the empathizer rather than the empathized” 
(p. 153).
How would Jim have reacted for the rest of the 
interview if I had suggested, however gently, that 
his way of interpreting his travel experiences was 
in some way linked to oppression? Would he have 
become defensive and closed himself off to me? 
How would he have felt if I had “saved up” my 
feelings in this regard and then, after listening sup-
portively for 2 hours to his analysis of his experi-
ences, hit him up with my take on things. Would he 
have felt betrayed?
I firmly believe that critical analyses of travel like 
those I attempt, which include deconstructing the 
ways tourists make sense of what they encounter, 
are important for the world—that they can be vital 
contributions to a broader discourse that seeks to 
advance equality and compassion. But if, in pursuit 
of this goal, I prioritized rapport in order to access 
Jim’s perspective, validating it with my silence, 
without also creating an opportunity through which 
Jim could individually grow with regard to his own 
views of the world, then was I using him unfairly? 
Are the students who give their time and energy to 
talk to me about their experiences merely the eggs 
that must be cracked to create the greater omelet of 
social change?
What’s even worse is that I benefit individually 
from the situation: I get to have a smooth, enjoy-
able, conflict-free interview exchange about a topic 
of interest to me, and I get to make a living writing 
up the research report. In this regard, I am reminded 
of Bono’s wise words from U2’s Zoo TV era in 
the early 1990s: “Every artist is a cannibal, every 
poet is a thief. They all kill their inspiration and 
then sing about their grief.” I publish my report, 
society is a smidge better off, and I get a paycheck 
(at last, now that a university has finally “bought 
me” from the ham hock booth), but is all of this in 
some way at Jim’s expense—at the cost of his own 
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growth because, in wanting to validate him and his 
perspective, and in wanting to gather data success-
fully, I failed to tell him what my experience has led 
me to know about the world? Should the research 
encounter be pedagogical?
A supportive colleague, older and wiser than me, 
once made the comment upon hearing this story that 
it is important to remember that personal growth 
takes a long time. Sometimes simply planting the 
seed through an interview conversation can cause 
individuals to reflect on their own over time. After 
all, as Bruner (2005) tells us, we are always mak-
ing sense of what has happened to us over and over 
throughout the course of our lives, always in new 
contexts as we mature and our situations change. 
Thus, there is cause to champion a subtle approach 
in which gentle prodding, which may be hardly 
noticeable at the time, can have wonderful effects in 
the long run. I worry about such reasoning becom-
ing an excuse in my own research or teaching, how-
ever—an opportunity for me to be lazy or to hide 
from conflicts and uncomfortable situations in the 
name of wanting to “respect” others by letting them 
figure things out for themselves.
4
 Finding the line 
between being a pedagogical slacker and an over-
bearing zealot can be harder than it seems. Did I do 
right by Jim? By the world, for its greater good? I 
wish I knew, but years later, I still have no answers.
Notes
1
These ideas are key elements in a perspective that has 
been expressed by some scholars as “critical realism” (see 
Patomaki & Wright, 2000), and they also bear affinities with 
pragmatism (see Rorty, 1989, 1999), but in the interest of 
preventing confusion, I am opting not to open these cans of 
worms in the present discussion.
2
Again, some readers may recognize this as a classic 
pragmatist position, but again, fully contextualizing this 
argument in pragmatism would go well beyond the space 
available here.
3
See Bott (2010), for an excellent account of how our like 
or dislike of research participants can shape data collection 
outcomes.
4
See Brogden and Patterson (2007) for an excellent dis-
cussion on this tension.
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